Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space

On Dec 26, 3:30 pm, il... RemoveThis @rcn.com wrote:
> On Dec 26, 5:49 am, Tim Bruening <tsbru... RemoveThis @pop.dcn.davis.ca.us> wrote:
>
> > In one of the Beowolf Shaffer stories, we learn of an interesting custom
> > involving kidnapping: Kidnappers are not only paid the ransom they
> > demand, they are given contracts of immunity and anti-publicity!
> > Beowolf says that's better than having the kidnap victim be murdered!
>
> Hadn't such things happened in real world occasionally?

I don't see how a contract with a kidnapper could be legally binding.
Obviously you could give a kidnapper any promise or document he wants
in order to release his victim. You could promise him immunity, no
publicity or the crown of England. But once he's released, what's
stopping you from breaking it?
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

On Dec 26, 8:39 am, Michael Grosberg <grosberg.mich... RemoveThis @gmail.com>
wrote:
> On Dec 26, 3:30 pm, il... RemoveThis @rcn.com wrote:
>
> > On Dec 26, 5:49 am, Tim Bruening <tsbru... RemoveThis @pop.dcn.davis.ca.us> wrote:
>
> > > In one of the Beowolf Shaffer stories, we learn of an interesting custom
> > > involving kidnapping: Kidnappers are not only paid the ransom they
> > > demand, they are given contracts of immunity and anti-publicity!
> > > Beowolf says that's better than having the kidnap victim be murdered!
>
> > Hadn't such things happened in real world occasionally?
>
> I don't see how a contract with a kidnapper could be legally binding.
> Obviously you could give a kidnapper any promise or document he wants
> in order to release his victim. You could promise him immunity, no
> publicity or the crown of England. But once he's released, what's
> stopping you from breaking it?


Shhhhhh.

Of COURSE you break it. You secretly kill the kidnapper once the
victim is safe. However, you don't let that become public knowledge.
Let the "policy" remain in place and at least _some_ kidnappers will
fall for it. An almost charming eagerness to believe in loopholes that
will let them get away with something is fairly common in criminal
circles. I know that there is a criminal urban legend that you cannot
be charged with attempted murder if you shoot someone below the
waste.

Will in New Haven

--

" It is well that war is so terrible -- lest we should grow too fond
of it." - Robert E. Lee
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

>  I had a random thought about how to make bribery pretty much non-existent
> through a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma.
>
>  If someone attempts to bribe you and you turn them in you get to keep the
> bribe.
>
>  Example:
>
>  Assume you are a city health inspector. Joe Slumlord offers you $5000 to
> ignore numerous health code violations in his building. You accept but you
> also inform the appropriate authorities who record Joe making the pay off,
> arrest and convict him.
>
>  You get to keep the $5000.
>
>  It won't be long before all of the potential bribers realize that there is
> no percentage in trying to bribe officials.

Except, as a city health inspector, I make more money by honoring the
deal and getting another $5000 next year and every year after that.
Not to mention by not scaring away other slumlords.

Your scheme only works if the officials being offered a bribe are
fairly honest to begin with. Corrupt ones will quickly figure out
about "killing the goose that lays golden eggs" and will stop turning
bribers in -- assuming they did in the first place.
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

> The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of the
> official taking the first bribe.

That's usually the case already. Yet most bribers prefer to pay again
when needed, rather than commit "mutually assured destruction" by
handing that proof to police.

Or do you mean provide the *briber* similar immunity from prosecution
-- whoever goes to authorities first gets to keep what he got (either
bribe money or official favor), and the tardy one goes to jail? That
may work better than pullo's original proposal, although still won't
work if both parties to the bribe know how to plan ahead: "You get
$5000 year after year. I save more than that year after year by not
fixing the apartments. Even with immunity from prosecution we are both
better off not ratting on each other." But most criminals are not that
rational.
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

"Will in New Haven" <bill.reich.RemoveThis@taylorandfrancis.com> wrote in message
news:ebccc066-2afb-4256-99fe-eb98f47ef87d@e25g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> On Dec 26, 8:39 am, Michael Grosberg <grosberg.mich....RemoveThis@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>> On Dec 26, 3:30 pm, il....RemoveThis@rcn.com wrote:
>>
>> > On Dec 26, 5:49 am, Tim Bruening <tsbru....RemoveThis@pop.dcn.davis.ca.us> wrote:
[snip various thoughts on crime and punishment]

I had a random thought about how to make bribery pretty much non-existent
through a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma.

If someone attempts to bribe you and you turn them in you get to keep the
bribe.

Example:

Assume you are a city health inspector. Joe Slumlord offers you $5000 to
ignore numerous health code violations in his building. You accept but you
also inform the appropriate authorities who record Joe making the pay off,
arrest and convict him.

You get to keep the $5000.

It won't be long before all of the potential bribers realize that there is
no percentage in trying to bribe officials.
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

On Dec 26, 3:49 am, Tim Bruening <tsbru... RemoveThis @pop.dcn.davis.ca.us> wrote:
> In one of the Beowolf Shaffer stories, we learn of an interesting custom
> involving kidnapping: Kidnappers are not only paid the ransom they
> demand, they are given contracts of immunity and anti-publicity!
> Beowolf says that's better than having the kidnap victim be murdered!

Probably the best way to get some insight into why this might happen
would be to turn to the SF of another author.

I recommend "The Killing Machine" by Jack Vance.

John Savard
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

<ilya2.RemoveThis@rcn.com> wrote in message
news:90e081e3-bc99-4397-9fb1-2309c267ae46@x69g2000hsx.googlegroups.com...
>> I had a random thought about how to make bribery pretty much non-existent
>> through a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma.
>>
>> If someone attempts to bribe you and you turn them in you get to keep the
>> bribe.
>>
>> Example:
>>
>> Assume you are a city health inspector. Joe Slumlord offers you $5000 to
>> ignore numerous health code violations in his building. You accept but
>> you
>> also inform the appropriate authorities who record Joe making the pay
>> off,
>> arrest and convict him.
>>
>> You get to keep the $5000.
>>
>> It won't be long before all of the potential bribers realize that there
>> is
>> no percentage in trying to bribe officials.

>Except, as a city health inspector, I make more money by honoring the
>deal and getting another $5000 next year and every year after that.
>Not to mention by not scaring away other slumlords.

>Your scheme only works if the officials being offered a bribe are
>fairly honest to begin with.

Not at all. in fact just the opposite. It hinges on the increased
uncertianty on the part of the briber as to whether or not the bribee will
stay bought.

> Corrupt ones will quickly figure out
> about "killing the goose that lays golden eggs" and will stop turning
> bribers in -- assuming they did in the first place.

You aren't looking at it from the _briber's_ perspective. He can't be sure
if the bribee will be honest in staying bought or turn him in.

The Official's choice is to take the risk of accepting a bribe, not turning
him in and being liable to criminal charges in the hopes of continued
payoffs - an incentive no doubt - and taking the one time legitimate payment
and hoping that next time there will be another briber.

While it is possible that the odd official will take the former option the
salient point is that the Slumlord doesn't know which choice the official
will make. The success of the scheme does not depend on every official
turning in every briber. It depends on the uncertainty created by the
riskless gain now available to the official.
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

On Dec 26, 1:55 pm, il... RemoveThis @rcn.com wrote:
> > The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of the
> > official taking the first bribe.
>
> That's usually the case already. Yet most bribers prefer to pay again
> when needed, rather than commit "mutually assured destruction" by
> handing that proof to police.
>
> Or do you mean provide the *briber* similar immunity from prosecution
> -- whoever goes to authorities first gets to keep what he got (either
> bribe money or official favor), and the tardy one goes to jail? That
> may work better than pullo's original proposal, although still won't
> work if both parties to the bribe know how to plan ahead: "You get
> $5000 year after year. I save more than that year after year by not
> fixing the apartments. Even with immunity from prosecution we are both
> better off not ratting on each other." But most criminals are not that
> rational.


I'm sure this is something that could be set up as a game theory
problem. And then argued about anyway.

Will in New Haven

--

On Dec 26, 5:14 am, doggystyle <43087... RemoveThis @recpoker.com> wrote:
> No one could have handled the Cuban Missle crisis any better than what Kennedy
> did!!

Tell that to the families of the people he first (foolishly) promised
to support and then left to die on the beach at the Bay of Pigs. He
should have cancelled the operation but he was afraid to look soft.
Then he panicked and ordered the people who should have been supplying
the landing to pull off. It isn't germane that others planned the
operation. His decisions; his responsibility, his shame. Glad someone
shot him.

Will in New Haven

--

"The Lieutenant expects your names to shine!"
Sgt. Zim in <Starship Troopers> by
Robert Anson Heinlein, USNA '29
Lt.(jg), USN, R'td
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

<ilya2.TakeThisOut@rcn.com> wrote
>> I had a random thought about how to make bribery pretty much
>> non-existent
>> through a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma.
>
>> If someone attempts to bribe you and you turn them in you get to keep
>> the
>> bribe.
>
>> Example:
>
>> Assume you are a city health inspector. Joe Slumlord offers you $5000
>> to
>> ignore numerous health code violations in his building. You accept
>> but you
>> also inform the appropriate authorities who record Joe making the pay
>> off,
>> arrest and convict him.
>
>> You get to keep the $5000.
>
>> It won't be long before all of the potential bribers realize that
>> there is
>> no percentage in trying to bribe officials.

>Except, as a city health inspector, I make more money by honoring the
>deal and getting another $5000 next year and every year after that.
>Not to mention by not scaring away other slumlords.

>Your scheme only works if the officials being offered a bribe are
>fairly honest to begin with. Corrupt ones will quickly figure out
>about "killing the goose that lays golden eggs" and will stop turning
>bribers in -- assuming they did in the first place.

The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of the
official taking the first bribe.

Karl Johanson
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

<ilya2 DeleteThis @rcn.com> wrote
>> The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of
>> the
>> official taking the first bribe.
>
> That's usually the case already. Yet most bribers prefer to pay again
> when needed, rather than commit "mutually assured destruction" by
> handing that proof to police.

I mean they can threaten mutually assured destruction, so the bribee has
no incentive to report either the bribe, or the original point that they
accepted the bribe for.

> Or do you mean provide the *briber* similar immunity from prosecution
> -- whoever goes to authorities first gets to keep what he got (either
> bribe money or official favor), and the tardy one goes to jail? That
> may work better than pullo's original proposal, although still won't
> work if both parties to the bribe know how to plan ahead: "You get
> $5000 year after year. I save more than that year after year by not
> fixing the apartments. Even with immunity from prosecution we are both
> better off not ratting on each other." But most criminals are not that
> rational.

Karl Johanson
 >> Stay informed about: Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space 

"Will in New Haven" <bill.reich.DeleteThis@taylorandfrancis.com> wrote
> I know that there is a criminal urban legend that you cannot
> be charged with attempted murder if you shoot someone below the
> waste.

Probably because if you've buried someone in a landfill before shooting
them, it's unlikely anyone will find the body.

--
Dan Tilque
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"Karl Johanson" <karljohanson.RemoveThis@shaw.ca> writes:

><ilya2.RemoveThis@rcn.com> wrote
>>> The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of
>>> the official taking the first bribe.
>>
>> That's usually the case already. Yet most bribers prefer to pay again
>> when needed, rather than commit "mutually assured destruction" by
>> handing that proof to police.

>I mean they can threaten mutually assured destruction, so the bribee has
>no incentive to report either the bribe, or the original point that they
>accepted the bribe for.

Sounds like incentive for the corrupt official to start demanding
bribes. Otherwise he can say to a potential briber, ``If you don't pay
me the $10,000, I'll claim you offered me $20,000, and who are they gonna
believe? I've already turned in five attempted bribers.'' So the
official gets his protection money or he gets to make an example of the
reluctant *plus* a bonus *plus* a Public Reputation for Honesty.

--
Joseph Nebus
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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"Joseph Nebus" <nebusj-.TakeThisOut@-rpi-.edu> wrote in message
news:nebusj.1198780134@vcmr-86.server.rpi.edu...
> "Karl Johanson" <karljohanson.TakeThisOut@shaw.ca> writes:
>
>><ilya2.TakeThisOut@rcn.com> wrote
>>>> The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of
>>>> the official taking the first bribe.
>>>
>>> That's usually the case already. Yet most bribers prefer to pay again
>>> when needed, rather than commit "mutually assured destruction" by
>>> handing that proof to police.
>
>>I mean they can threaten mutually assured destruction, so the bribee has
>>no incentive to report either the bribe, or the original point that they
>>accepted the bribe for.
>
> Sounds like incentive for the corrupt official to start demanding
> bribes. Otherwise he can say to a potential briber, ``If you don't pay
> me the $10,000, I'll claim you offered me $20,000, and who are they gonna
> believe? I've already turned in five attempted bribers.'' So the
> official gets his protection money or he gets to make an example of the
> reluctant *plus* a bonus *plus* a Public Reputation for Honesty.

Uh, no. If the reward is to keep the bribe then there is no incentive to
falsely accuse someone. They get to keep an imaginary bribe.

I would also stipulate that a simple claim by the official would be
insufficient. There would have to be corroboration.
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