Kidnapping In Larry Niven's Known Space

On Wed, 26 Dec 2007 09:57:08 -0800 (PST), ilya2 RemoveThis @rcn.com wrote:

>>  I had a random thought about how to make bribery pretty much non-existent
>> through a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma.

>>  If someone attempts to bribe you and you turn them in you get to keep the
>> bribe.

>>  Example:

>>  Assume you are a city health inspector. Joe Slumlord offers you $5000 to
>> ignore numerous health code violations in his building. You accept but you
>> also inform the appropriate authorities who record Joe making the pay off,
>> arrest and convict him.

>>  You get to keep the $5000.

>>  It won't be long before all of the potential bribers realize that there is
>> no percentage in trying to bribe officials.

>Except, as a city health inspector, I make more money by honoring the
>deal and getting another $5000 next year and every year after that.
>Not to mention by not scaring away other slumlords.

Oh, you can do much better than that. You can, in addition to collecting
your $5k/year from every crooked slumlord in town, hit up every honest
landlord for $5K as well, threatening that if they don't pay you'll report
*them* for bribery, using $5K of your own cash as a refundable prop to
make the story look good.

Yeah, yeah - "...authorities record Joe making the payoff", and the whole
implicit assumption that once somebody reports an (attempted) bribery,
proving the matter will be a trivial afterthought. Do people really think
that's how it works, that the crooked slumlord or whatever actually tells
the health inspector, "I'll pay you $5K to pass me on the inspection, but
I don't have the cash on me - what say we meet at your office at 10:30
tomorrow morning to make the payoff?"

Yes, that's how most of the bribery scandals you see on the evening news
play out - because only the tiny minority of white-collar criminals so
mind-bogglingly stupid as to do it that way are in any danger of getting
caught.

Meanwhile, the real problem is that anyone with half a brain can figure
out how to offer or accept a bribe in such a manner that even if someone
were recording the whole thing on film and tape there probably wouldn't
be a convicton. And if cash does have to change hands (already a gross
failure of imagination on someone's part), it isn't likely to do so on
any sort of a schedule.


>Your scheme only works if the officials being offered a bribe are
>fairly honest to begin with. Corrupt ones will quickly figure out
>about "killing the goose that lays golden eggs" and will stop turning
>bribers in -- assuming they did in the first place.

This whole scheme can only work if, A: all would-be bribe-payers are
complete idiots, or B: all potential bribe-recipients are completely
honest and we can convict people on no other grounds than "a civil
servant says this guy tried to bribe him..."

The first time anyone solicited a bribe from my partner and I, it took
the form of a government contracting officer saying, "your company is
about to get audited. If you fail the audit, which will be conducted
by a good friend of mine, I will have no choice but to cancel this
$750,000 contract you were just awarded. But I just want to help you,
so I'm going to refer you to this other good friend of mine, accountant
who helps small businesses prepare for government audits, only charges
$200/hour, shouldn't take more than a couple days, you'll be so glad
you did..."

I suspect most people do just fork over the $3200, or whatever, and
everyone except maybe the taxpayer lives happily ever after. Perhaps
the original poster could explain how his scheme would render that sort
of thing "virtually non-existant"?


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
*John.Schilling@alumni.usc.edu * for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

On Wed, 26 Dec 2007 18:06:30 GMT, "Karl Johanson" <karljohanson DeleteThis @shaw.ca>
wrote:

><ilya2 DeleteThis @rcn.com> wrote
>>> I had a random thought about how to make bribery pretty much
>>> non-existent through a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma.

>>> If someone attempts to bribe you and you turn them in you get to keep
>>> the bribe.

>>> Example:

>>> Assume you are a city health inspector. Joe Slumlord offers you $5000
>>> to ignore numerous health code violations in his building. You accept
>>> but you also inform the appropriate authorities who record Joe making
>>> the pay off, arrest and convict him.

>>> You get to keep the $5000.

>>> It won't be long before all of the potential bribers realize that
>>> there is no percentage in trying to bribe officials.

>>Except, as a city health inspector, I make more money by honoring the
>>deal and getting another $5000 next year and every year after that.
>>Not to mention by not scaring away other slumlords.

>>Your scheme only works if the officials being offered a bribe are
>>fairly honest to begin with. Corrupt ones will quickly figure out
>>about "killing the goose that lays golden eggs" and will stop turning
>>bribers in -- assuming they did in the first place.

>The briber doesn't need to make a second bribe, if he has proof of the
>official taking the first bribe.

Which he doesn't, because most people who either offer or take bribes
aren't complete idiots.

Plus, as others have already pointed out, mutual assured destruction
profits nobody, whereas recurring mutual trade profits everyone. It
is not enough to make "turn the other guy in" a zero-cost option; you
need a way to make that option *more profitable* than the alternative.

Since the alternative is to keep the bribe/favor and maybe get many
more of the same in the future, your plan where the "honest" party
keeps this bribe/favor but establishes a reputation as someone who
should never be offered bribes or favors in the future, cannot help
but be less profitable.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
*John.Schilling@alumni.usc.edu * for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *