C. S. Lewis, Miracles, chapter three (the argument from re..

Hello,

I have been reading C. S. Lewis' _Miracles_, and have been trying to
get my head around his argument against naturalism. I'm still not
sure I fully understand it, but it seems to me like he only succeeds
in showing that, if naturalism is true, we cannot know it for sure.
Therefore, naturalism may or may not be true. Here's my
understanding; please let me know where I might have gone wrong:

C. S. Lewis, Miracles, chapter 3 (the argument from reason)

"No account of the universe can be true unless that account of the
universe leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real insight."

If we assume that our thinking is a real insight (an assumption it is
hard to live life without making, so fair enough), then a true account
of the universe must leave it possible for our thinking to be a real
insight. Naturalism does leave it possible for our thinking to be a
real insight. To prove naturalism to be false, Lewis must show that
naturalism makes it impossible for our thinking to be a real insight.

Lewis thinks that it is impossible to account for reason by
naturalism, because ground-consequent relations between thoughts
cannot be explained by cause-effect relations: "(T)he two systems are
wholly distinct. To be caused is not to be proved. . . The
implication is that if causes work inevitably, the belief would have
had to arise whether it had grounds or not." So all beliefs (true or
false) are the products of natural causes, which work inevitably, but
not toward any purpose. But it does not follow that because beliefs
are the product of causes that work inevitably, they cannot be true; a
belief could be explained in terms both of cause-effect relations and
ground-consequent relations; they are not mutually exclusive.

According to naturalism, reason would have had to have arisen by
natural selection, whereby behaviours which aided survival were passed
on and those which didn't were weeded-out. We can see how reason
would aid creatures in survival: thought processes, the results of
which corresponded to the way things actually were (i.e. that reached
truth) would be much more useful for survival than those that didn't.
So it is fair to say that natural selection would favour mental
processes that reached truth, even though such processes were the
result of causes which were inevitable and worked towards no purpose.

Lewis thinks it is impossible for natural selection to account for the
development of reason: "It is inconceivable that any improvement of
responses could ever turn them into acts of insight, or even remotely
tend to do so." But Lewis does not show that it is impossible for
natural selection to explain the development of reason, just that he
doesn't know how it happened.

If the explanation given by naturalism about the evolution of reason
is true, then we cannot say that reason is infallible. Humans have
survived so well because our brains enable us to reach true
conclusions alot of the time. But that doesn't mean that we always
reach true conclusions. So we cannot say that reason is infallible;
we can't trust that it always helps us to reach true conclusions.

If we can't be sure that reason is reliable, then we cannot trust that
our reasoning about naturalism is true. But it does not necessarily
follow that naturalism cannot be true. It just means that naturalism
might be true, but we can't know.

We started this investigation with the assumption that our thinking is
a real insight. I assume that Lewis thought naturalism must be false
because it seemed to contradict this initial assumption. But the
assumption was made for pragmatic, not epistemic reasons. It may well
be that our thinking is not always a real insight, but the only way we
can function in the world is to assume that it is. So I don't
really see an incompatibility here; can't one be justified in saying,
"I choose to believe that naturalism is true; I know that if
naturalism is true, my thinking might not always be a real insight;
but I choose to believe that it is for practical purposes"?

I think your argument here is kind of ... at cross purposes with Lewis's.
The issue has been discussed recently by Victor Reppert in his blog (search
for "C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea" ) iirc, and some years ago well here
(see Google Groups archives). Sorry there are only a few of us left manning
this outpost. Try Into the Wardrobe forums also.

To take an ignorant stab at it myself.... Suppose you're building a shed
and figuring out the height of posts and beams and stuff, and how long to
cut some angle braces, etc etc. We can never be quite sure we've got that
right (or precisely right even if the shed stands up). But we can (in
another way) be quite absolutely sure that 1 + 1 = 2. It's a different KIND
of certainty. May I call it Carpenter Knowledge vs Euclid Knowledge?

Yes, we may as well assume that our common Carpenter Knowledge is reliable
(well, as reliable as such things go). To assume our Euclid Knowledge is
reliable, because, well, we all seem to have it and here we are, and it
seems useful, etc ... is not the kind of certainty Euclid is used to.

To support the Euclidean kind of certainty ... needs a Euclid whose brain
is free to follow ground/consequent tracks.


Bree
-----------



On Sat, 21 Jul 2007 19:51:46 -0700, . wrote:

> Hello,
>
> I have been reading C. S. Lewis' _Miracles_, and have been trying to
> get my head around his argument against naturalism. I'm still not
> sure I fully understand it, but it seems to me like he only succeeds
> in showing that, if naturalism is true, we cannot know it for sure.
> Therefore, naturalism may or may not be true. Here's my
> understanding; please let me know where I might have gone wrong:
>
> C. S. Lewis, Miracles, chapter 3 (the argument from reason)
>
> "No account of the universe can be true unless that account of the
> universe leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real insight."
>
> If we assume that our thinking is a real insight (an assumption it is
> hard to live life without making, so fair enough), then a true account
> of the universe must leave it possible for our thinking to be a real
> insight. Naturalism does leave it possible for our thinking to be a
> real insight. To prove naturalism to be false, Lewis must show that
> naturalism makes it impossible for our thinking to be a real insight.
>
> Lewis thinks that it is impossible to account for reason by
> naturalism, because ground-consequent relations between thoughts
> cannot be explained by cause-effect relations: "(T)he two systems are
> wholly distinct. To be caused is not to be proved. . . The
> implication is that if causes work inevitably, the belief would have
> had to arise whether it had grounds or not." So all beliefs (true or
> false) are the products of natural causes, which work inevitably, but
> not toward any purpose. But it does not follow that because beliefs
> are the product of causes that work inevitably, they cannot be true; a
> belief could be explained in terms both of cause-effect relations and
> ground-consequent relations; they are not mutually exclusive.
>
> According to naturalism, reason would have had to have arisen by
> natural selection, whereby behaviours which aided survival were passed
> on and those which didn't were weeded-out. We can see how reason
> would aid creatures in survival: thought processes, the results of
> which corresponded to the way things actually were (i.e. that reached
> truth) would be much more useful for survival than those that didn't.
> So it is fair to say that natural selection would favour mental
> processes that reached truth, even though such processes were the
> result of causes which were inevitable and worked towards no purpose.
>
> Lewis thinks it is impossible for natural selection to account for the
> development of reason: "It is inconceivable that any improvement of
> responses could ever turn them into acts of insight, or even remotely
> tend to do so." But Lewis does not show that it is impossible for
> natural selection to explain the development of reason, just that he
> doesn't know how it happened.
>
> If the explanation given by naturalism about the evolution of reason
> is true, then we cannot say that reason is infallible. Humans have
> survived so well because our brains enable us to reach true
> conclusions alot of the time. But that doesn't mean that we always
> reach true conclusions. So we cannot say that reason is infallible;
> we can't trust that it always helps us to reach true conclusions.
>
> If we can't be sure that reason is reliable, then we cannot trust that
> our reasoning about naturalism is true. But it does not necessarily
> follow that naturalism cannot be true. It just means that naturalism
> might be true, but we can't know.
>
> We started this investigation with the assumption that our thinking is
> a real insight. I assume that Lewis thought naturalism must be false
> because it seemed to contradict this initial assumption. But the
> assumption was made for pragmatic, not epistemic reasons. It may well
> be that our thinking is not always a real insight, but the only way we
> can function in the world is to assume that it is. So I don't
> really see an incompatibility here; can't one be justified in saying,
> "I choose to believe that naturalism is true; I know that if
> naturalism is true, my thinking might not always be a real insight;
> but I choose to believe that it is for practical purposes"?