brocktren RemoveThis @canada.com (btren) wrote in message news:<e884f2f3.0309230629.5de513b3 RemoveThis @posting.google.com>...
> hegel RemoveThis @sociologist.com (hegel@sociologist.com) wrote in message news:<1c0c91f7.0309222056.27efc5da RemoveThis @posting.google.com>...
> > brocktren RemoveThis @canada.com (btren) wrote in message news:<e884f2f3.0309141940.181cb23b RemoveThis @posting.google.com>...
> > > hegel RemoveThis @sociologist.com (hegel@sociologist.com) wrote in message news:<1c0c91f7.0309141344.339973b9 RemoveThis @posting.google.com>...
> > > > brocktren RemoveThis @canada.com (btren) wrote in message news:<e884f2f3.0309140909.5290e970 RemoveThis @posting.google.com>...
> > > > > Now there's a question for the times. With some thought, I conclude
> > > > > that the liberal democratic conception of freedom is wise - very wise.
> > > > > Comments, anybody?
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps you could share some of these thoughts. (I briefly scanned
> > > > your previous posts and didn't see any extending rumination over these
> > > > thoughts posted to this newsgroup.)
> > > >
> > > > I'm in the habit (as was Orwell) of immediately distrusting any
> > > > concept put forward as self-evident, in this case "the liberal
> > > > democratic conception of freedom" (let's agree to leave aside the
> > > > issue of "wisdom" and the more abstract debate over "conception" for
> > > > now). Removing "conception" and "wisdom" we are left with three
> > > > highly contentions words: "liberal", "democratic", and "freedom".
> > > > After investigating these terms -- with your lead (or, perhaps,
> > > > Gene's, who appears to agree with you) -- maybe we can eventually come
> > > > around to agreeing whether or not the "liberal democratic conception
> > > > of freedom" is indeed "wise".
> > >
> > > Well, a rather interesting reply. Yes - it's very contentious, I would
> > > say. I should note that the notion was not put forward as self-evident
> > > - when I say 'some thought', it does not imply 'little
> > > thought/background required'. The notion of the 'liberal democratic
> > > conception of freedom' - that also is not suggested to be
> > > self-evident.
> >
> > Maybe you could let me in on it. It's hard to discuss the "liberal
> > democratic conception of freedom" when you refuse to tell me what it
> > is exactly that we are discussing.
>
> Have you checked out the 'thoughts on j.s. mill' posting? Or the
> postings in can.politics? There are other postings there and on this
> newsgroup also. There is also a posting on freedom of speech in
> Canadian courts, if I recall correctly - and various relevant postings
> against 'totalitarianism' in this newsgroup. possibly, you may wish to
> check out a few postings I made in alt.politics.international - there
> are some somewhat philosophical 'debates' there.
There is no reason for me to do so. If you want to talk about the
"liberal democratic conception of freedom", the onus is on you to tell
the discussants what exactly is being discussed. I can only surmise,
based upon your vague references to other newsgroups, that either you
have nothing to contribute to the discussion or are unwilling to do
so.
>
> >
> > > anyway,
> > > you may also wish to check out some postings I have done on some
> > > various philosophical topics - a posting on 'thoughts on j.s. mill'
> > > springs to mind, but there are others - oh yeah, there should be a
> > > posting on some musings on moral philosophy also on this newsgroup.
> >
> > At no point in these posts to you address the topic of liberal,
> > democratic, or freedom.
>
> Hmm. Well, it seems you have checked out some postings. I see you are
> not well versed in certain aspects of fundamental justifications for
> liberal democracy.
On the contrary: there are so many contradictory justifications for
this concept that it is impossible to know exactly what you are
talking about. Take any two contemporaries describing themselves as
liberals and see how little they agree on what "liberal democracy" is
and how it relates to "freedom". For instance, fell free to check out
the tired and never-ending debate between Habermas and Rawls. Or, if
you are so inclined, take a look at Mill and Hayek. If anything, the
person who is "not well versed" is in fact you -- you've given me no
reason to believe anything but this.
> for another very brief look at this, again, check
> out the freedom of speech posting. very brief - but also fairly
> relevant. What is your notion of the 'ideal society'?
Not being a reactive nihilist, I don't have a notion of an ideal
society. Do you?
> How is it
> 'justified'? What is your take on various aspects of Mill's 'On
> Liberty'?
I find Mill overated as a philosopher, but an excellent ideologue.
Utilitarianism -- be it Benthamite hedonism or some flakey
'qualitative' version from Mill -- is an utter insult to humans. I
have no interest in utility.
>
>
> >
> > > I
> > > should think that with a pseudonym as that that you may have some
> > > interesting comments on the idea of freedom. I would be interested to
> > > see your views.
> >
> > There isn't much more to say on the topic that Nietzsche didn't
> > already say, I'm thinking especially of the second essay in his
> > Genealogy.
>
> Now, haven't read this, but that is an amazing statement. Nietzche
> does not strike me as a philosopher with the greatest perspective on
> the idea of freedom.
On the contrary, I see his perspective as a horizon beyond the
horizon. Let's quickly look at a part of the argument in Genealogy
II: the essay, titled "'Guilt,' 'Bad Conscience,' and the Like",
being a classic of the high modern period, seeks to discover how we
(and he is clear on this: Westerners) became modern. (Keep in mind,
and this is fundamental, that the first essay is an attack on Hegel,
especially the Master/Slave dialectic in PhG.) Nietzsche begins his
investigation wondering how it is that humans transformed themselves
from mere animals into animals with the "right" to make promises. For
Nietzsche, this is "the real problem regarding man" (II, 1). The
first step in this process is to create a creature with "an active
*desire* not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something
desired once, a real *memory of the will*" (II, 1). This memory has
the function of bridging the "I will" (i.e., present) with "I shall"
(i.e., future) -- this orientation between present and future (and,
because of memory, the past) results in a *calculating* (i.e.,
reasonable and responsibility) individual (II, 1-2). This ability --
to remember -- has a dual origin: in the creditor/debtor relationship
and in punishment (II, 3-9).
We're still not at the core of your problem -- which seems to be
something how "liberal democracy" expresses the ideal combination of
"justice" and "freedom" -- but we're getting there. II, 10 and II, 11
are fundamental. First step: "As its power increases, a community
ceases to take teh individual's transgressions so seriously, because
they can no longer be considered as dangerous and destructive to the
whole as they were formerly ... the whole from now on carefully
defends the malefactor against this anger, especially that of those he
has directly harmed, and takes him under its protection." He
continues, "As the power and self-confidence of a community increase,
the penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or
imperiling of the former brings with it a restoration of the harsher
forms of the latter." (As an aside, see Durkheim's work on penal
evolution and Elias's work on the history of manners for the details
of this.) Second step: as the community increases in power, it
follows that individuals decrease in power. (Recall the first essay
on Master and Slave moralities.) "Law" administered by the state
steps for the now impotent individual with the very liberal goal of
"*preventing* all struggle in general" which "would be a principle
*hostile to life*". (Carl Schmitt fills in the details in his Concept
of the Political, Kojeve makes the same argument from a Hegelian
perspective in his lectures on the PhG.) How is it that this is the
case? "'Just' and 'unjust' exist, accordingly, only after the
institution of the law". So, "legal conditions can never be other
than *exceptional conditions*, since they constitute a partial
restriction of the will of life, which is bent upon power, and are
subordinate to its total goal as a single means: namely, as a means of
creating *greater* units of power."
In typical fashion, Nietzsche spends the rest of the essay (II, 11-25)
arguing that this is a bad state of affairs, but it is not possible to
go back -- afterall, we've created the faculty of memory. So we
either continue to decay or we somehow overcome this sorry state of
affairs. Nietzsche hopes for the latter, of course.
> I would be profoundly amazed if I didn't read
> that and conclude that you were talking philosophical nonsense,
> rubbish of a very high degree.
I can't force any conclusions on you, nor do I have any desire to do
so.
> That sort of statement indicates that
> you are perhaps a mildly good thinker, but have very fundamental
> limitations to your perspective.
Good thing I haven't made any claims as to my ability to think. But
then, I don't have to -- afterall, I have you to psychologize me at a
distance.
> I may check that out - perhaps you
> could provide some links or a summary.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1887/1967) On the Genealogy of Morals, Walter
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollindale (trans.), New York: Random House.
Available at your local library and bookstore. I don't particularly
recommend any of the other translations. But the one from Cambridge
UP is acceptable -- especially for the early essays appended to it.<!-- ~MESSAGE_AFTER~ -->
>> Stay informed about: Liberal democratic conception of freedom - is it 'wise'? 
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