the rhetoric of economics

'as i write, the fortunes of rhetorical man are on the upswing, as in
discipline after discipline there is evidence of what has been called
the interpretive turn, the realizatyion (at least for those it seizes)
that the givens of any field of activity- including the facts it
commands- the procedures it trusts in, and the values it expresses and
extends- tare socially and politically constructed, are fashioned by
man rather than delivered by hod or nature. the most recent (and
unlikely) field to experience this revolution,or at least to heart of
its posibility, is economics. the key text is donaldydeirdrie
mccloskey's the rhetoric of economics,, a title that is itself
polemical since, as mccloskey points out, mainstream economists dont
like to think of themselves as employing a rhetoric,; rather, they
regard themselves as scientists whose methodology insulates them from
the appeal of special interests or points of view. they think in other
words that they are free from metaphysicsm morals and personal
conviction'. to this mc responds by declaring (in good sophistic
terms) that no such knowledge is available and that while economic
method promises to deliver it, ''what it is able to to deliver (and)
renames as scientific methodology (are) the scientist's and
e4specially the economist's metaphysics, moral and personal
convictions'. impersonal method, then, is both an illusion and a
danger( as a kind of rhetoric it masks its rhetorical nature) and as
an antidote to it mc offers rhetoric which he says deals not with
abstract truth, but with the truth that emerges in the context of
distinctly human convesations. within these converrsations thereare
always ''particular argmuments good or bad. after making them there is
no pooint in asking a last summarisking question 'well, is it
True?'it's whatever it is- persuasive intersting useful and so
forth... there is no reason to search for a general quality called
Truth, which answers only the unanswerable question 'what is it in the
mind of God' the answerable questions are always asked within the
assumptions of particular situations, and both question and answer
''will always depend on one's audience and the human purposes
involved' the real truth, concludes mc, is that ''assertions are made
for purposes of persuading some audience'' and that, given the
unavailability of god's eye view, 'this is not a shameful fact', but
the bottom line fact in a rhetorical world.

at the first conference called to consider mc's arguments, the
familiar anti rhetorical objections were heard again in the land and
the land migght well have been 5th century athens as welleslys
massachusseettts in 1986. one participant ospoke of 'the primrose path
to extreme relativism' which proceeds frrom 'kuhn's conception of
incommensurability of paradigms to the ''contention that there are no
objective and unambiguuous procedures for applying... rules since the
meanings of particular actions and terms are entirely context
dependent.. other twits said nothing in mc's position was new (an
observation certainly true) that everyone already knew it, and that at
any rate it didnt even touch the core of economist's practice. still
other invoked a set of related (and familiar) distinctions between
empirical and interpretive activities, because demonstration and
persuasion, between verifiable procedures and anarchic irrationalism.
of course, each of these objections had already been forumulated (or
reformulated) in those disciplines that had head of rhetoric's siren
song long before it reached the belated ears of economists. the name
that everyone always refers to (in praise or blame) is thomas kuhn.'

stanley fish doing what comes naturally change rhetoric and the
practice of theory in literary and legal studies page four hundred and
cant remember

tralala. two things. he became a she in what i wonder could be
considered a mystical turn into the chicago creepy bunch.

On Mar 21, 8:50 am, sirbl... RemoveThis @hotmail.com wrote:
> 'as i write, the fortunes of  rhetorical man are on the upswing, as in
> discipline after discipline  there is evidence of what has been called
> the interpretive turn, the realizatyion (at least for those it seizes)
> that the givens of any field of activity- including the facts it
> commands- the procedures it trusts in, and the values it expresses and
> extends- tare socially and politically constructed, are fashioned by
> man rather than delivered by hod or nature. the most recent (and
> unlikely) field to experience this revolution,or at least to heart of
> its posibility, is economics. the key text is donaldydeirdrie
> mccloskey's the rhetoric of economics,, a title that is itself
> polemical since, as mccloskey points out, mainstream economists dont
> like to think of themselves as employing a rhetoric,; rather, they
> regard themselves as scientists whose methodology insulates them from
> the appeal of special interests or points of view. they think in other
> words that they are free from metaphysicsm morals and personal
> conviction'. to this mc responds by declaring (in good sophistic
> terms) that no such knowledge is available and that while economic
> method promises to deliver it, ''what it is able to to deliver (and)
> renames as scientific methodology (are) the scientist's and
> e4specially the economist's metaphysics, moral and personal
> convictions'. impersonal method, then, is both an illusion and a
> danger( as a kind of rhetoric it masks its rhetorical nature) and as
> an antidote to it mc offers rhetoric which he says deals not with
> abstract truth, but with the truth that emerges in the context of
> distinctly human convesations. within these converrsations thereare
> always ''particular argmuments good or bad. after making them there is
> no pooint in asking a last summarisking question 'well, is it
> True?'it's whatever it is- persuasive intersting useful and so
> forth... there is no reason to search for a general quality called
> Truth, which answers only the unanswerable question 'what is it in the
> mind of God' the answerable questions are always asked within the
> assumptions of particular situations, and both question and answer
> ''will always depend on one's audience and the human purposes
> involved' the real truth, concludes mc, is that ''assertions are made
> for purposes of persuading some audience'' and that, given the
> unavailability of god's eye view, 'this is not a shameful fact', but
> the bottom line fact in a rhetorical world.
>
> at the first conference called to consider mc's arguments, the
> familiar anti rhetorical objections were heard again in the land and
> the land migght well have been 5th century athens as welleslys
> massachusseettts in 1986. one participant ospoke of 'the primrose path
> to extreme relativism' which proceeds frrom 'kuhn's conception of
> incommensurability of paradigms to the ''contention that there are no
> objective and unambiguuous procedures for applying... rules since the
> meanings of particular actions and terms are entirely context
> dependent.. other twits said nothing in mc's position was new (an
> observation certainly true) that everyone already knew it, and that at
> any rate it didnt even touch the core of economist's practice. still
> other invoked a set of related (and familiar) distinctions between
> empirical and interpretive activities, because demonstration and
> persuasion, between verifiable procedures and anarchic irrationalism.
> of course, each of these objections had already been forumulated (or
> reformulated) in those disciplines that had head of rhetoric's siren
> song long before it reached the belated ears of economists. the name
> that everyone always refers to (in praise or blame) is thomas kuhn.'
>
> stanley fish doing what comes naturally change rhetoric and the
> practice of theory in literary and legal studies page four hundred and
> cant remember
>
> tralala. two things. he became a she in what i wonder could be
> considered a mystical turn into the chicago creepy bunch.

But let us not forget the following important refelction by
Heironymous Divertious:
This dissertation is not about hunter-gatherers but an investigation
of two aspects of hunter-gatherer studies: one which presents a poetic
view of the "primitive" by positing a dichotomy with civilisation and
the another which applies scientific explanation to evidence. It is
also deliberately interdisciplinary in that it derives its source
material from archaeology, anthropology, sociology and classical
studies. The word primitive is not often to be found in modern
archaeology but is still common in the writings of Ancient History,
often used as a contrast to civilised (e.g. "Primitive Man", Cambridge
Ancient History). I shall not attempt a definition of primitive here
as the dissertation itself is an attempt to understand the idea
itself. Despite its absence in archaeology, the belief that hunter/
gatherers represent primitive ways of life is still common in the
sense that it is the foremost or incipient way of life.
Archaeological and anthropological studies of primitive or hunter/
gatherer societies provide time depth and cultural comparisons
(respectively and together) which offer perhaps the most remote
position from which to reflect upon our own modern western culture, a
perspective by which we may assess what we have gained in the light of
what we have lost. To pursue these disciplines for some objective
knowledge goal is an impossible and false project which can only
result in a reiteration of the assumptions by which the definitions
and agendas of civilised thought are set. As a student of both
archaeology and ancient history I am concerned to offer an account of
this topic which draws upon both areas of my discipline. Ancient
history's tacit assumption is that the origins of our own culture,
found in the ancient civilisations of Greece and Rome was founded on
the rejection of "natural" and "primitive" ways of life. I will show
that an interest in our primitive state existed in early writings and
shares some aspects in common with present discourse and that an
ongoing dialogue between the civilised and the primitive exists to
define one in terms of the other. Despite the assertion that "nothing
resembling a discipline of archaeology can be said to have existed in
any of these (classical) civilisations" (Trigger 1989;31) I feel that
in a changing discipline the writings of classical authors may be able
to have an increasing role in post-processual archaeology as they may
be able to provide contextual information, often lacking from the "new
archaeology". Indeed, to reject the historical writings of the past
would be to deny our own discourse a role in the future. I hope to
show that ancient history, does offer something not available from a
scientific archaeology. And although the classical authors views of
the past remain speculative, they offer an underlying mythical basis
mediated by available data. I hope to demonstrate that myth is not
something that stands opposed to truth and that myth, history and
science share resonance by providing structure and meaning in a
chaotic world. I will suggest that future discourse on the past
should not privilege either science, history or myth as they may offer
insights into the past in respect of the present.

"Poetry is more philosophical and more weighty than history, for
poetry speaks rather of the universal, history of the particular."
Aristotle Poetics.

(i): Hesiod and Myth
The re-birth of writing in ancient Greece (c.800-700) marks the
beginning of literature and reflections on the primitive condition of
human kind. From this time two threads emerge. One which emphasises
progress and the other degeneration. For the purposes of this
dissertation I shall concentrate on the latter. From Hesiod we are
offered an age system, the first in history, which sees the human past
divided into a Golden age, Bronze age, an age of Heroes and of an age
of Iron. It is his Golden age which still holds our imagination as
his description of it has much resonance with our own image of hunter/
gatherer life. This notion of a primitive golden age was ubiquitous
throughout the Classical period, also found in Juvenal (e.g. Satires
VI), Virgil and Ovid. These excerpts provide reflections on the
egalitarian, the sharing of food, the order of custom against the rule
of law and upon the toil which the adoption of agriculture entails.
Virgil; " Before Joves time no settlers brought land under subjection,
Not lawful even to divide the plain with landmarks and boundaries, All
produce went to a common pool, and earth unprompted was free with all
her fruits" . "All good things were theirs and the grain-giving soil
bore up its fruits of its own accord in unstinted plenty" (Ovid
continues.) "Golden was that first age which unconstrained, with heart
and soul, obedient to no law, Gave honour to good faith and
righteousness, No punishment they knew, no war..." . (Virgil) "then
through experiment might forge man's various crafts... man struck the
hidden fire that lies in veins of flint".
This marks the end of the golden age when the Promethean fire, a
metaphor for technological innovation, ends the age. Hesiod's story
reflects his life of toil among the ruins of previous cultures. Each
successive generation faces a worse fate than the last. The silver
race invented crime. The bronze were fierce warlike monstrous
heroes. The heroes were his predecessors of the Trojan war and he
laments; " would that I were not born among the fifth", never free
from toil and misery. Each change from one stage to another is marked
by humans transgressing the status quo.

How is it that in the absence of archaeological data this notion of a
pre-agricultural golden age fits so closely with our own ideas
concerning the prehistoric and modern hunter/gatherer life? Hesiod
provides us with the first glimpse of a way of life that we would
characterised as hunter/gatherer, as those of the golden age are able
to live happily without agriculture. What Hesiod has done is to
identify certain necessary factors which are required of a simple
life. From his standpoint the daily toil of agriculture cannot have
been an original state of human kind as knowledge, technique and
method have to be learned. The myth of Works and Days simply dissects
learned behaviour the social laws and toil to rationally infer an age
when all was more simple. To live without agriculture it is necessary
for nature to provide food. With abundant food there is no need for
conflict, without conflict no laws or wars need be pursued. His
degenerative meta-narrative is thus preserved by necessary factors.
It should then be no surprise that along side this was another meta-
narrative of progression. Anaximander is the first natural
philosopher to be credited with the notion of evolution (LLoyd 1970).
His scheme also may be logically rationalised. Human babies are the
most helpless of all animals. So the first humans must have been born
and succoured by another creature.

(ii): Rousseau and the Putative History
A definition which could easily be offered for myth is one which
Rousseau offered for history. History is "a tissue of fables whose
morals are well adapted to the human heart"(Shklar 1969;6). Rousseau
called for a "proper anthropology the purpose of which is self
knowledge and the means of the authentic understanding of the other"
as he was convinced that we have come to know no other men except the
Europeans ... under the pompous name of the study of man" (Diamond
1974;102). It is clear that Rousseau understood the interested
nature of historical discourse and was unhappy with the
characterisation of "savage" peoples as sub-human. He is often
attributed with the notion of the noble savage, seeing in them a
simple, enviable way of life which his contemporary civilisation had
long forgotten. This stood in sharp contrast with the right wing
views of Hobbes who thought primitive life to be "nasty brutish and
short" (Hayden 1993). In his writings Rousseau constructed a putative
historical scheme which charted "man's" development from earliest
times. In this he shared with Hesiod a notion of a golden age. In
Rousseau's scheme the basic unit is the family, which is economically
self sufficient, which enjoys an independent intercourse with others
of its kind. This avoided the corrupt and competitive pressures upon
which civilisation was based. Civilisation was divided by
specialisation of tasks to create dependencies. (Charvet 1974; 24ff),
property is seen as necessitating economic inequality. The initial
pure state of nature was destroyed by the first revolution in which
families are distinguishable for the first time. From then on we
become recognisably "men" (Masters 1968;167) forming bands which
become nations bound not by the force of law and regulation but by
character and the order of tradition. Life before civilisation was
gentle (Second Discourse 2;169) until the second revolution in which
metallurgy and agriculture were invented. This caused the ruination
of the human race, as agriculture necessitates the notion of property
and a state of war can only arise from property relations (Second
Discourse 1,4,p56). Civilisation thus became corrupt by creating
labour claims, property and ultimately a war of all (Masters 1968;
166). Fundamentally Rousseau's history is putative and conjectural,
told to convey a political message which reflected the corruption and
oppression of pre-Revolutionary France. Social man is corrupt, as he
is aware of his existence for others, he is also dependant on others.
This network of dependencies is Rousseau's primary cause for human
misery. "Man was born free yet everywhere he is in chains" (Social
Contract 1,1,1). The pre-agricultural golden age preserves human
well-being, as it provides a situation in which social relations are
at a minimum (Charvet 1974). Rousseau acknowledged the putative
nature of his history: "The happy life of the golden age could never
really have existed for the human race. When men could have enjoyed
it they were unaware of it; and when they could have understood it
they had already lost it" (Cole 1973;156). Nonetheless Rousseau's
history is convincing as it models some of the necessary connections
between civilisation and human dependency, a connection which is not
often recognised by twentieth century archaeological models which
describe the process of state formation, as they tend to rely
reductionist principles which employ the prime movers of population
growth or the relationship between humans and their ecology. So the
fundamental difference is that modern models tend to mask the
political significance of toil, corruption and oppression and in this
way add to a meta-narrative of progressive change whereas both Hesiod
and Rousseau conceive this change as retrogressive.

(iii): The Harvard Kalahari Project and Science
Despite Rousseau's concerns for the future of the study of "man",
racist and imperialist interests were served by ethnographers employed
to assess the needs of colonial authorities (Kuklick 1991; 293) rather
than providing empathic accounts of the primitive, they only succeeded
in portraying brute savages in need of redemption and development. It
was not until the second half of this century that we see a positive
attitude to challenge the assumption that hunter/gatherer life was
"dismal" and that the Neolithic was a great leap forward (Sahlins in
Lee & DeVore 1968; 85). Lee & DeVore's study (1976) of the Dobe !Kung
challenged many assumptions and in doing so seemed to confirm the
thoughts of Hesiod and Rousseau. Technological advance, it was
thought required "time in surplus". The San who spend no more than 19
hours per week in subsistence activities felt no need for advance.
Sahlins has pointed out that hunter/gatherer life was characterised by
a state of material plenty and although they had "a low standard of
living" their balance ("Zen" fashion) between need and want provided
an unworried existence. He does not define his criteria for his
"standard" but if we are to judge from the amount of time available
for leisure and socialising there standard would be very high. The
account given by Lee & DeVore (1976) of the !Kung San is an attempt at
a full picture of hunter/gatherer life. It is concerned with
demography, environment, public health, personal development and the
cognitive world. These categories reflect the concerns of the modern
world and much of the analysis reads like a governmental census with
graphs on life expectancy and so on. In spite of this, the project
provides a unique look into the San life, especially the work of Katz
& Marshall (ibid.). Katz's investigation into the beliefs and
attitudes of the San shows how their life in the desert is made
possible by an ideological framework which provides the basis for
their egalitarian and co-operative social relations. They are
naturally generous: there is no word for "thank-you" and to fail to
share food shares joint first place as the most important "wrong
doing" (the other is making crooked arrows (Marshall, ibid.; 371)). A
rich social life of ritual dance and healing provide for social
cohesion and co-operation. Lee was thought to have been witness to a
"primitive" survival. In line with Levi-Strauss' notion of
"cold" (Levi-Strauss 1973; 29/30) societies, the San were thought to
represent the initial stage of an evolutionary process that had passed
them by.
(iv) Discussion
Myth is seen as a "means of ordering human experience related
primarily to the preoccupations of the age that produces or preserves
it" (Murray 1980; 14). This definition is not unlike certain views
emerging from post-processual archaeologists who define historical
discourse as written in the present. History is a "retrospective
regrouping" (Foucault 1972; 31) of information which serves the
interests of the society which produces it. These interests select
from historical data that which support a social model or narrative,
all else is rejected as contingent (Shanks and Tilley 1987; 54 ff), or
more precisely, contingent factors are simply not recognised as they
do not fall within the remit of the research framework. Levi-
Strauss(1966; 21), would characterise myth, in opposition to science,
as the remains of observations which do not distinguish between the
contingent and the necessary. The object of myth according to Levi-
Strauss is to "preserve ... the remains of methods of observation and
reflection which precisely adapted to discoveries of a certain
type: ... a speculative organisation of the sensible world."(ibid.
p16). Here, then we seen myth in opposition to science both serving
to provide an understanding of the sensible world. In the Straussian
picture of myth, contingent and necessary factors can be introduced
into the explanation. On the face of it science is best equated with
history in its rejection of the contingent. However, it is
contemporary, and therefore contingent, interests which motivate the
reproduction of history. In other words: as the motivational
interests are located anachronistically in the present they are only
contingent on past events serving the present in which the history is
written. Accordingly Levi-Strauss would suggest, that we may learn
more from history by what is left out rather than what is put in, as
it selects "discontinuous figures, against a continuity barely good
enough to be used as a backdrop" (Tilley 1990; 36). In this way
history provides a teleological meta-narrative by presenting selective
data and is delusive in that it hides from the reader this aspect of
its production. This method of historical production is witnessed by
historiography, which reveals the shortcoming of history in
hindsight. History, also, serves ideological interests no more or
less than myth. The preservation of myth depends on its ability to
encompass necessary factors if it is to be understood in time depth.
Hesiod's golden age is still relevant, to this dissertation, not
because it preserves contingent facts but because it supports
necessary ones (the ones I have consciously selected). History is
different only in the fact that the narrative subsumes present
ideological interests which are contingent only on the present which
produces it. Outdated ideological interests such as the Aryan
kulturgeshichte of Kossinna which aided Nazi racism are ironically
rejected as myths by the same scientific/historical methods which saw
them as the simple facts of history. Elements not well suited to
modern interests become mythical in hindsight. Thus do the histories
of the past enter the realm of myth. Other elements within putative
and rationally formulated histories have the potential for survival.
In this way model building has survived since it only offers those
rationally formulated elements. However, the method by which the
"facts" of myth, or history are determined as either contingent or
necessary are to be found within the scientific ideological concerns
of today. I would suggest that science, no less than the verse of
Hesiod is a means of shaping the world. The method is utterly
different but the result is the same; an ordering of the sensible
world. For us it is science which provides our mythical understanding
of the world. Levi-Strauss would suggest that myth serves as science
to the primitive and science is the myth of civilisation. Science is
also motivated by the interests of the present no less than myth. If
its claims to be truly objective are correct then there could be no
scientific fact which could be challenged. The history of science is,
however, littered with defunct discoveries, in view of which, it is
hard to understand the degree of scientism alive in archaeology
today. It will not be long before the Kalahari golden age joins the
others. Recent debates (Schrire, (Gordon & Denbow)1984, Headland &
Reid 1989, Wilmsen & Denbow 1990) have pointed to Lee's "anecdotal
scientism, uniformitarianism and his undigested Marxist naive
historicism"(Wilmsen & Denbow; 496/7) which have been employed to
describe a "savage survival". The !Kung San have been characterised
as a "quintessential isolate" to serve the needs of evolutionary
theory. What such critique ignores is the value inherent in a
philosophical notion of "primitive" in what it may help us reflect
upon.

Part Two:
The Archaeology of the Primitive,
Some Theoretical Concerns

Lee & DeVore, in the introduction to Man the Hunter, suggest that a
future examination of the worlds stratigraphy will show agriculture
and thermonuclear destruction as simultaneous events. It is
continually reiterated that for 99% of the human past we have existed
as hunter/gatherers: "our ancestors must have subsisted by hunting and
gathering for 99% of this time... Much of what makes us human is the
product of selection pressures that were acting for thousands of
generations." (Bailey 1989; 666/7). Human physiology is clearly
adapted to the hunter/gatherer way of life. The physiological
importance of a grasping hand, bipedal upright posture, hand to eye co-
ordination and stereoscopic vision has enabled hunting with weapons
on the move, expert gathering of small fruits and the fabrication of
technological items. These factors are ideally suited to a hunter/
gathering way of life and can be used to distinguish us from other
animals. It is thus thought that hunter/gatherers may provide a
unique key to understanding what it is to be human. Archaeology
provides the only link to a time when there was no other way of life.
How does the scientific approach compare with the above poetic picture
of a golden age?

Within the scientific approach to palaeolithic hunter/gatherers
there are two paradigms offered by Gamble(1986: 8/9), culture history
in which the distribution and deposition of the various material
culture assemblages are related to the spatial and temporal movement
of archaeological cultures and culture as adaptation which takes as
its starting point the comment of White that culture is "man's extra-
somatic means of adaptation" (ibid.) and that the emergence of novel
material culture assemblages may be explained by an evolutionary
framework. I would like to suggest another paradigm which has
recently emerged: culture as optimal behaviour. This provides models
(Bettinger, Jochim, Keene & Mithen) based on the uncritical assumption
of culture as adaptation to assess and explain how material culture
might be employed in adaptive subsistence strategies for the
acquisition of food (usually meat).

It is clearly realised that an "archaeological culture" is not
equivalent to a real culture or necessarily representative of an
ethnic identity. Thus culture-history is now used as little more than
a descriptive analysis of the distribution of evidence by typology and
is not used to provide or assume an explanatory framework as it once
was. I would like, however to assess the roles of adaptation and
optimal behaviour.

(i) The Myth of Evolution
During the renaissance many scientists built on classical writing to
challenge the world view of the Catholic church which was built on an
uneasy alliance of biblical thought and Aristotlean physics (Rowlands
1992). An example among these, was De Maillet in his book Telliamed.,
which suggested that all life had evolved from the sea. The
evolution, he said, of the earth and life had taken millions of years.
Using the device of a dialogue, he pitted the wits of a Jesuit with
that of a eastern sage, so that he could speak freely (without legal
sanction of the Catholic church) on the controversial subject of the
age and origin of the earth and the evolution of life. For this he
referred to the pre-Socratic Greeks such as Anaximander suggesting
"all and animals had come from fish, birds had come from flying fish,
lions from sea-lions and men from mer-men." , also " The earth had
once been covered by sea and was now emerging over millions of
years" . Modern science would now characterise such notions as
nonsense as science grows it abandons outdated notions, elevating the
current thought as correct. It was De Maillet and others such as
Buffon, Lamark, LaMettrie and Diderot joined in French enlightenment
attack on biblical stories to provide a picture of development which
enabled a theory of evolution.

This growing scepticism provided a chance for evolutionary theory to
flourish. Darwin's provision of a coherent theory to explain the
origins of life came into a world of religious scepticism in which
evolutionary theory, both social and biological, was already hotly
debated (Bowler 1989). Indeed it is wrong to attribute Tylor's theory
to Darwin, as Boas did (Ingold 1986; 29). Darwin's codification of
the dynamic process by which species came about was immediately
mustered to support cultural evolution and a pre-existing notion of
white supremacy as convenient justification to portray other races as
"missing links" (Bowler 1989; 106). To assess its value we must first
review what he said as it is puzzling how his theory has been
mobilised to support a theory of evolution, a word he was himself at
pains to avoid (Dunnell 1980). The emergence of a program of social
evolution and eugenics was based on the conflation of Darwin's theory
of natural selection and the more naive and teleological historical
notions of "progressive" thought. Darwin describes an unguided
mechanism which results from a dynamic relationship between organisms
and their environment. There is no implication that this relationship
is goal oriented or directed to any end. Indeed the very description
of this process was intended to avoid any implication of purpose. It
is essentially an outcome rather than a cause. It is not a law of
nature but its uncritical application to archaeological data has risen
its status to a law-like process.
The theory of natural selection relies on three factors:
1)empirical variability, 2) persistence of transmission
of some or all variability and 3) differential representation of
transmitted variability in subsequent state (Dunnell 1980). Kirch
(1980) has defined evolution as change that results from differential
persistence of variability under the selection pressure of
environment. The only driving force suggested by Darwin was that
unsuccessful individuals perish. Therefore natural selection does not
act to cause us to survive. Neither does it directly assist evolution
by preserving traits that enhance survival. There is no positive
mechanism, only a negative one. Change merely results in the
elimination of those factors that cause us to perish before the
individual gets a chance to procreate. When this, negative mechanism,
is understood we can see the world of infinite variety as just
existing randomly and not just for reasons of survivability, enabling
us to reject the pernicious teleology which such approaches are heir
to. Natural selection does not guarantee that a particular behaviour
or physiological feature may prove significant to survival but life is
enhanced by this variety in as much as it provides a random and not
teleological response to changing environmental circumstances. This
picture also enables and re-casts an understanding of human cultural
experience as self determining rather than the gross interpretation
which require all human phenomena to be "for something". This
negative mechanism can lead both to survival and extinction but can
explain neither. Most traits must be seen as random, conferring no
particular advantage of disadvantage." ...99% (of Human social action)
has no direct survival value in terms of conveying any definitive
selective advantage."(Shanks & Tilley 1992;56). Dunnell points to a
lack of sophistication and uncritical borrowing in archaeology
(Dunnell 1980; 37) but fails to provide a convincing set of criteria
by which cultural traits may be judged. Such a difficulty is further
expressed in the confusion of the function of an object or trait with
its evolutionary status. This "ad hoc Darwinism" (Dunnell 1980;39)
portrays a naive confusion between the concepts of how and why; what
it does equals what it is for. Such an idea is certainly not Darwin's
who warned against any notion that change could be understood with a
view to eventual function. In much archaeological literature the
words adaptation and adaptive are uncritically substituted for change
and function; as if to confer some kind of explanation of
development. This assumes an underlying process which steers
adaptation in response to environmental or cultural changes.
Kirch(1980; 101) who criticises archaeologists and anthropologists for
not taking the trouble to define fundamental principals of the
adaptive process fails in this assumption by failing to take account
of human agency. He sees fitness as the "goal of evolution"(ibid.;
103). Such language as "response" and "goal" are being substituted
for providence by maintaining the illusion of purposefully guided
change. For example, Mithen (1989) in his rebuttal of post-processual
criticism of evolutionary theory uses the words "guided, constrained
and goal". Surely purposeful change must involve human intentionality
and agency? Evolutionary approaches are geared to reject this.
Humans make themselves through the structures defined within a
symbolic world, that we imposes on ourselves (consciously and
unintentionally). These structures are often conspicuously
unconcerned with the factors of survival and reproduction of the
fittest. Humans are less concerned with the evolutionary past than
they are with the social present. What evolutionary theory is in
danger of doing is to diminish the value of "cultural traits" by
portraying them as the unconscious results of inevitable development.

Between the blow dealt by Boas in the 1930s and the advent of the new
archaeology of the 1960s, evolutionary theory was kept alive by only a
few American practitioners. Their chief difficulty was the search for
reliable selective criteria that would bridge the gap between function
and adaptive significance. In White's scheme the adaptiveness of
society could be measured by thermodynamic capture (Kirch 1980; 105).
This, simply stated, measured directly the value of a social group by
its ability to harness energy per capita. The difficulties with this
should be immediately obvious, as maximally efficient capture of
resources will eventually lead to the extinction of those resources.
Thus an adaptive system judged by the same selective criterion could
be defined as a maladaptive system. Another common choice for a
selective criterion: survival, is also limited in that the problems of
survival were solved long ago. Perhaps best by societies we would
characterise as the most simple. The Harvard Kalahari project (Lee &
De Vore 1976) as shown how easily, in terms of human effort, survival
has been achieved, so much so that the use of survival as a selective
criteria cannot explain human complexity. Thus we must seek
explanation of social change elsewhere. Kirch "presumes" his
selective criterion to be "reproductive fitness" (Kirch 1980;109).
But again, this could be maladaptive or adaptive as ultimately
reproductive fitness would lead eventually to over population. There
seems little attempt to recognise the potential for these criteria to
be as maladaptive as they are adaptive. Additionally all attempts to
find an all encompassing criteria ignore the particular human and
historical contexts in which the object of study is found. This
exemplifies a wider problem when reductionist scientism is applied to
historically particular situations.

It is possible that for a cultural evolutionary perspective, a human
contextualised selective criteria could indicate a Lamarkian rather
than a Darwinian paradigm in which human choice can replace the
missing mechanism by which Lamark thought that characteristics could
be "acquired". In other words humans actively direct fitness to
acquire cultural characteristics to promote themselves. Such a
change in perspective sets the emphasis from "copulation to
education" (Kirch 1980), switching between a reliance on biological/
genetic change to one in which human purpose guides evolution
purposefully by maintaining cultural phenomena. This pseudo-Lamarkism
requires, however that the ideology of the society in question is
motivated by a notion of progressive change. Such an ideology can be
said to exist in western capitalist society and could be argued that
such an ideology is perfectly suited as an adaptive strategy in and of
itself. But if so, why is it not ubiquitous? Clearly it is not, this
would suggest the blanket application of evolutionary theory to all
human culture is inappropriate. I would suggest that even societies
in which progress and evolution are guiding forces would fail to
fulfil their goals. For success to come from individuals and groups
acting to improve their situations would require the irreconcilable
worlds of voluntarism and determinism to act simultaneously: an
absolute determined knowledge of the world together with the freedom
and will to change for the benefit of the culture in question. This
also forms a problem for evolutionary theory itself. How are we to
distinguish which behaviour patterns are adaptive, maladaptive or
adaptively neutral without presupposing a set of "cultural norms" by
which we characterise functional and dysfunctional societies and
traits within those societies. We must realise that the purpose of
survival and progress is not an impersonal meta-force, like a system
beyond human agency, but a human choice. Progress is not inevitable
but change is. Progress is merely a human invention (Bowler 1989).

(ii) Systems Thinking and Cybernetics
The introduction of systems theory by David Clarke(1968) marked new
roads into traditional "naive" archaeological studies. For the first
time masses of data could be organised, regardless of context under
the aegis of a generalised set of law-like rules. Explanation could
be gained from spatially and temporally diverse sources by the
application of single all encompassing generalised ideas. Society
could now be divided into component parts which could be represented
in almost any social form. This formalisation reduced the tyranny of
the particular to provide explanatory tools with which to describe the
dynamics of society in the form of feedback, cause and effect. The
various divisional structures (Social system, Political system, etc.)
were seen as universal and Clark makes explicit his belief that these
universal factors should be expunged of "anthropomorphisation". He
is thus explicitly rejecting any human factors which are thought to
pre-define or predetermine research questions which is seen as
affecting the objectivity of the data. The "new archaeology" has
forged a new understanding of how modern humans inhabited the globe by
providing a generalised synthesis of the masses of particular data.
In the post Clarkian period we have seen the production of models
which attempt to explain hunter/gatherer behaviour. These optimal
foraging theory models are highly problematic in application. They
rely on simplistic and reductionist views on world and human
behaviour. There are difficulties choosing the right "currency" for
deciding "cost", failing to answer, in the absence of cultural
context, whether a resource is for food or secondary products. The
model provides synchronic (annual), high resolution data from a closed
ethnographic system. It is applied to a diachronic, low resolution,
open archaeological system. This fails to provide for the main
project of archaeology: process and change. It thus masks any failures
in the resource strategy as it fails to show how the system came to an
end. An example is Jochim (1976, xiii-xv) who aims to produce a
general cross-cultural model to predict economic behaviours. It is
claimed that this can be achieved by testing the validity of
assumptions made in the literature and gathering them together into a
coherent whole, by presupposing a set of behaviour patterns for all
hunter/gatherers past and present. This is modified by reference to
particular environments. Hunter/gatherers are thus reduced to an
ideal form, a control against which to test various environmentally
and seasonally determinable factors in a rational and predictable
way. This relies on a functional classification of tools under the
methodological direction of wear-use analysis. (The inadequacies of
typical, functional categorisation of tools is pointed out by Hodder
(1987) (p 26 below). The model demands that hunter/gatherers are able
to make rational choices in the selection and maximisation of resource
collection. In this task the hunter/gatherer is reduced to a decision
maker in a "game"(Jochim 1976;6) with competing criteria, which
variously attempt to either maximise yield, minimise regret, measure
pessimism/optimism, asses strategy or satisfy some predetermined
aspiration. Hunter/gatherers are most importantly portrayed as
needing to maximise yield and minimise effort. The codification of
the various constraints, resources and components of the decision
making process is accomplished via a systems approach, which places
humans within an ecosystem. Thus human action is reduced to its
ecological significance. Significantly Jochim pays lip service to
cultural context. "It must be remembered, however, that the exploited
natural environment is culturally defined, so that the 'cognized'
environment may differ from that seen by the ecologist" (ibid.; 9). I
would suggest that in most hunter/gatherer ideologies that the
culturally defined natural environment is not seen as "exploited" but
rather, primitive ideologies have developed an indivisible interface
with their environment (Turnbull 1960, Mayberry-Lewis 1991). Jochim
insists that the definition of exploitable and desirable resources
depends, to a large extent, upon technological and value systems, and
this process of definition must be examined. I would suggest the very
application of the word exploitation ignores a lesson learned long ago
by all successful primitive cultures: that their well being and
existence is inextricably linked with the well being of their local
environment, a lesson western civilisation seems to have forgotten as
it denies that its own local environment is effectively global.
Jochim's realisation of the need for context is only applied to
determine the variety of the resource base utilised by the "economic
system", rather than as a notion capable of producing information that
would lead to any meaningful understanding of the social context. The
various mechanisms by which resources "should be" gathered offers a
remote view from a formalist position which can only result in the
casting of hunter/gatherers as a kind of proto-capitalist palaeo-
shopper, in a environmental super-market, whose chief concern is the
acquisition of resources. This entire methodology may criticised in
its rejection of the notion that economy is embedded in the social
practice. This method results in society being seen merely as an
adjunct to the monolithic ECONOMY. This results in the naturalisation
and justification of the modern exploitation of world resources.

A similar approach can be found in Keene(1981) in which natural
selection and competition are guiding forces in the planning of
economic activities and settlement location, which are directed to
provide the basic needs for survival at the lowest cost. The
tradition in this approach is still favoured by Mithen(1990) who
criticises Shanks and Tilley for portraying evolutionary theory as
leaving behind "plastic malleable cultural dopes incapable of altering
the conditions of their existence" (Shanks & Tilley 1987; 56). He
continues that a valid evolutionary approach must be founded upon the
view of the individual as an active agent (Mithen 1990; 7). To which
Shanks & Tilley would probably agree. Sadly this has not been the
case and Shanks & Tilley's objections are in fact quite valid.
Although Mithen recognises that humans make decisions, his assumption
(upon which his model depends) that they follow a predictable and
rational course reduces human behaviour to that which Shanks & Tilley
would characterise as mere utility. Promisingly, Mithen states that
the analogy between biological evolution and cultural evolution is
"misplaced" and he claims to restrict his use of the word selection to
the evolution of the decision-making capacities over a longer
scale. He claims, contra Hodder, Shanks and Tilley, that his approach
rejects the possibility that humans are characterised as passive, in
that they are seen as just reacting to external stimuli to serve the
function of adaptation. This claim fails to convince. It is clear
that he sees humans as decision makers, indeed we are all "experts at
decision making" (ibid.; 21). What is missing in understanding
between him and the post-processualists is that his approach is
founded on a fundamental caricature of foragers qua expert decision
makers guided ultimately by an innate of culturally conditioned "eco-
psychology". The ensuing discourse then reads the ethnographic and
archaeological data within that limited ideological framework,
producing a methodological tautology. In this way his approach
improves only a little on Jochim and Keene with whom he shares some of
the same mathematical operators. To what degree, might we ask, can a
forager actively involved in subsistence activity apply this formula
in his or her decision making process when attempting to choose
between killing a reindeer or picking berries?

m
PROB ijtd = ( * X ikjd F kjd + A it ) E it
k=1
The application of optimal foraging theory has many difficulties in
application. The portrayal of utility is continued by Mithen in his
other works. Mithen's work on Palaeolithic art is an attempt to
reveal a functional explanation for artistic endeavour. Decision
makers need information, he claims. Thus Mithen (1988) suggests that
the art served as some kind of information system concerning the state
and location of certain resources. Artistic themes are interpreted as
depictions of hoof prints, faeces, marks on vegetation and on the
ground. They are thought to have helped in the tuition of tracking
and locating prey. This view is difficult in that it does not
correlate with the use of art in extant hunter/gatherer societies. He
lists depictions of hoof prints and so on offering ethnographic
information on how hunters hunt. He states that hunters use their
eyes, ears and noses to justify depictions of visual, representations
of audible and olfactory depictions (faeces) but offers no direct
parallel where art is used as a teaching aid. Indeed the absence of
any such art in his evidence from his ethnographic examples would
suggest that hunter gatherers need no such aid of any kind.
Indicating that art requires other interpretations. By reducing the
depiction to a kind of text book, this interpretation trivialises the
art and the skilful art of hunting, ignoring the more abstract
meanings of art the world over. This interpretation reveals more
about Mithen as an academic than about the artists themselves.
Academics use information systems and depictions in what they do. If
the symbolic and cultural meanings are not recognised in this
misinterpretation, what are the implications for the utilitarian
approach in general? The problem has not gone unnoticed:
" ... the real problem for the prehistorian is not that social
relations are objectively invisible (for relations are not objects),
but that he (sic) cannot converse or 'participate' on an inter-
subjective level with people who are long since dead. It is surely
better to recognise this limitation for what it is than to populate
the prehistoric world with dummy 'economic men' bent on the impossible
goal of simultaneously maximising yield and minimising effort", Ingold
(1982;9)




(iii) The General Test: Progress, transmutes to Objective reality.
For Bury (1924) Progress became as idolum saeculi, the animating
force behind western civilisation. Progress was the general test to
which social aims and theories were submitted. The notion of progress
which underpinned ethnological discourse on the past, during the last
century (Kuklick 1991) is still taken as a tacit assumption today,
although we are warned against its use, modern scientific and
evolutionary approaches militate against a complete rejection of
progressive thought. The notion of an objective reality is a myth of
hitherto unimaginable proportions. In search for objective reality,
hunter/gatherer lifeways are described and tacitly compared
unfavourably with objectives their societies never intended to
achieve. The new archaeology rests "on the twin pillars of
functionalism and positivism, a true knowledge of the past [is] felt
to reside in following delimited sets of procedural rules such as the
hypothetico-deductive method linked to an explanatory theory stressing
systemness and notions of material culture as constituting a means of
societal adaptation to particular sets of ecological and social
circumstance ... This aims to produce a body of concrete
knowledge...a consensus "~ such a consensus is based on goals which
hunter/gatherers cannot compete with as they are primarily designed by
judging between competing knowledge claims to produce, "... harmonious
relationships between archaeologists and their data" (Tilley
1991;14). Against such a project a meaningfully constituted primitive
culture pales into insignificance against an avalanche of etic
arguments. The new archaeology has raised a mythical world of ideal
forms and categories against which no real social form can compare.
The discourse becomes one in which the past is reduced to a co-
relation between the objective world and the world of the past. The
general test is the measure of such a correlation: the data, as a
series of resistances compared with hunter/gatherers as wished for.
It is clear that by the application of the three paradigms that the
human palaeolithic is not well represented. At no other period
studied by archaeology is it more clear that the present is written
into the past, as it is by these means that palaeolithic hunter/
gatherer societies have been colonised by ideological forces of the
modern day which stress optimisation, efficiency and maximal
exploitation. The very forces which may be leading us into an
ecological disaster in the next century. Hesiod and Rousseau both
attempted to show the failings of their society. The golden ones, the
noble savages and the egalitarian of the Kalahari offer us a sad
reflection upon corruption, exploitation and hunger suffered the world
over.


Part Three:
A Post-processual future for the Palaeolithic?

(i)A Multiple Past
In his introduction to The Druids, Stewart Piggott, recalling
Collingwood, remarks that his subject was guided by three factors,
druids; as wished for, druids in themselves, and druids in evidence.
He asserted that archaeology's task was to uncover druids "in
themselves" with sole reference to the evidence. Studies of hunter-
gatherers and the primitive have followed a similar course. The aim
is to find the truth or actuality of the within the subject, a
Platonic dream to uncover an ideal and quintessential object. A
structuralist approach might suggest a visual representation of the
tensions within such an endeavour, thus: (Fig 1.).




Fig One Fig Two
I would have to admit that notions of the golden age lie towards the
top of this diagram. Palaeo-archaeologists would claim to lie
somewhere along the bottom line as archaeology's claim is that
objective knowledge can be gained simply by reference to the evidence,
ethnographic analogy mediated by mid-range theory. I would also claim
that the study concerns of ethno-archaeology and mid-range theory add
little to our understanding of hunter-gatherers outside the limited
remit of subsistence and economy (an economic interpretation "as
wished for"). Furthermore, without primary reference to cultural
context, even these limited spheres of interest are misrepresented.
Indeed a reliance on some notion of an objective knowledge goal can
only fail to reach "hunter-gathers in themselves". If we at first
accept that there is no unitary "hunter-gatherers in themselves", then
the we must also admit that there could be a range of possible
interpretations within a number of contexts (Fig 2.). This, of
course, accepts that there can be no consensus of opinion. The
resultant plurality may produce a more responsive and relevant
archaeology by offering a broad base of ideas. Much of archaeology
has been concerned with the destruction of myths and the promotion of
the "real facts of the past". Piggott, unlike his predecessor
Kendrick(1927), separated the popular connection of druids with
Stonehenge. But this has gone largely unnoticed by modern day druids
and most of the British public. It is still widely held that
"primitive savages" are evolutionary survivals. This would suggest
that archaeology is in danger of being largely irrelevant to popular
minds.

Levi-Strauss was conscious of the limitations of the notion of
primitive. The criticism was that "characteristics imputed to these
societies, called primitive, for lack of a better word, are only
illusions ... and do not correspond to reality." (Levi-Strauss 1973;
25/6). Undaunted he quotes Merleau- Ponty; " ... as a means of
understanding the cultural formations most remote from himself, he is
spontaneously indulging in philosophy" (cf. quote from Aristotle).
Perhaps we can do little more, to reach the primitive, that the
Kwakiutl informant of Boas did to understand the civilised. He
ignored New York's skyscrapers in favour of a Times square freak show
and brass bannister balls (ibid.; 27). By aiming for a consensus
relationship between data and the archaeologist the past is
homogenised with the present. Let the scientific approach grasp for
the freak show. If it is possible to empathise with any hunter-
gatherer society as Turnbull(1960) did then we can lay the ground for
a context (not the context) for an interpretation (Fig Two). For this
to occur it is necessary to admit to a plurality of interpretations
and anathematise consensus. Was it ever possible for a single story
of the past to exist in any case?

(ii)A Plea for Context.
The hunter gatherers in archaeology are judged against an objective
reality which demands optimisation, efficiency and adaptiveness. This
is the only context admitted by the "new archaeology". The
description of such a world relies on a balance between a
technological system, a subsistence system and an ecological system.
It is often the motivation to place technology between people and
nature showing a difficulty not with archaeological technique but with
the basic theoretical frameworks which resists consideration of social
contexts (Edmonds 1990; 27). All systems resist understanding in
terms of lived experience, notions of systems as such have no
contextual meaning, indeed such "meta-forces" (subsistence and
economy) are indistinguishable, in that they are bound up with other
practices. Indeed it is well argued that society which these
essences comprise do not exist in the sense of a "logic of
necessity". Such an existence appeals to a "foundational legislative
authority" by which general and abstract categories are justified
(Shanks & Tilley 1987;57). These questions have risen over the last
10-15 years by the various advocates of post-processual archaeology.
Ian Hodder(1986) characterises the new archaeology as encouraging a
"materialist" rather than "idealist" position. This materialist bias
infers from environmental and ecological evidence, to social and
settlement patterns and then to ritual and ideological factors,
"predicting functions upward from a material basis" (ibid.; 21)
(recalling Hawkes' hierarchy of inference and its inherent problems).
This, he says, reduces symbolic behaviour to "utility and
adaptation" (ibid.; 22). He points to the difficulty whereby all
functional, adaptive explanations are confused. Shanks & Tilley
(1987; 153) also point out that "adaptation always has to do double
service as both cause and consequence of change". The only interest
is in a long term look at survived features as these are assumed to be
selected. Hodder (1987; 22) points out that "there is a poverty to
systemic arguments which do not allow us to explain specific cultural
variability". He makes a plea to include what he calls an "ideational
realm" as an antidote to etic function and meaning. As function
assumes an end, the end considered should be one which includes
reference to a "matrix of cultural meanings" within the context of the
society studied. Categories which are bestowed upon cultural
phenomena are wrongly defined by modern convention rather than by
their authentic cultural significance. The meanings we assign to
descriptions of cultural phenomena are often imposed "covertly and
uncritically" (ibid.). For primitive societies the function of any
object or cultural trait simply cannot have an adaptive function as
such a notion emanates from western capitalist ideologies stressing
functional utility. Yet covering law, systemic approaches impose
cultural meanings from the outside without adequate consideration of
the social forces which create them. For example, burial becomes
associated with the function of social display and rich burial simply
indicates social rivalry. The systemic approach judges and codifies
the past such that it is familiarised, wiping out cultural and
temporal differences. Up until now post-processual archaeological
approaches have made few in-roads into the interpretation of
palaeolithic people. Its detractors would say that the specific
cultural meanings have long been lost without hope of replacement.
This is used as an excuse to replace them with their own ideological
meanings without any critical appraisal. Often this replacement is the
unconscious result of a belief in a universal reality which the
practitioner is "certain" of.

Human behaviour is not driven by scientific laws but proceeds from
human action within a symbolic context. Interpretations involving
contextual social relations are largely missing from the
palaeolithic. Giddens(1984) provides for and understanding of social
process which suggests that it results from a tension between
structure and agency within a framework mediated by ideology and
power. Cultural and contextual explanations must, he argues, proceed
from a recognition of human agency as a preliminary source, not from
the functional significance of its discarded material culture. His
"structuration theory" includes a recognition that agency is informed
by structure, that structure shapes human society by the mobilisation
of power relations and that change is brought about primarily by the
human perception of opportunity guided, not simply for reasons of
nutrition or reproduction, but by ideological factors which establish
intentions beyond functionality. The degree of effect of such
intentions is mediated by the ideological acquisition and allotment of
power provided by the social structure, within the group. Such a
theoretical approach would indicate the need for a social archaeology
of hunters and gatherers which would offer a more "meaningful"
understanding as opposed to providing hypothetical "explanations".
There is a real difficulty with this as the detail of palaeolithic
archaeology is poor. I believe that we can do more than simply
recognise this "limitation" (Ingold p.22 above). An empathic
hermeneutic approach, as advocated by Collingwood and Hodder, may be
able to restore a meaningful context to produce a symbolic and
ideological framework for future work. With what symbolic world might
we colonise the palaeolithic? Surely it is better to produce meanings
which removes the undue reliance on utility? I would suggest that the
discourse is already rich in the philosophical reflections necessary
for such a labour to continue (e.g. Mayberry- Lewis, Colin Turnbull,
Levi-Strauss) .

In recent years Lee's work on the Kalahari !Kung has been much
criticised and with it the model of hunter-gatherer mode of production
which some archaeologists have freely applied to hunter-gatherer
studies. Wilmsen & Denbow (1990) attack Lee's reliance on
ethnographic reification by pointing to a Kalahari "plagued by
caricatures"(ibid.; 493). "The categories Bushman, San, hunter-
gatherer and so forth are products of just such transmutation; they
legitimise a crucial area in EuroAmerica's symbolic reconstruction of
its own ontology". This is a hopeless, nihilistic position as they
criticise what we all do to in an attempt to understand the world
around us. I would suggest that such a framework has always been a
part of the discourse. Levi-Strauss talks about a contrastive mirror
by which societies understand themselves by their relationship with
the other. In the structuralist argument notions are defined in terms
of their opposites or antinomies. Below are some of the common
antinomies that have been applied to understand the civilised-
primitive dichotomy. They are wide ranging are derive from many
sources, scientific, historical and mythical. None of the above list
can be said to be exclusive to either and they have all been used to
understand the primitive. Many of the categories have been used as
part of an evolutionary construction.

Primitive Civilised
1 Egalitarian Hierarchical
2 Anarchy State
3 Small groups Large Groups
4 Dispersed, widespread Concentrated, centralised
5 Self sufficient Specialisation
6 Sustainable Dependant
7 Order of Custom, personal sanctions Rule of Law, abstract justice,
punishment
8 Persuasion Leadership
9 Sharing Property
10 Concrete, existential, holistic Abstract, empirical, categorical.
11 Reciprocity Trade, with profit
Fig three: A structural reflection

I would suggest that we might employ such ideas to form, as a primary
consideration, an empathic notion of hunting and gathering. We must
resist the assumption that such things as; sharing, customary
sanctions and egalitarianism are naive and outdated behaviour patterns
of an inferior age, but consider them to be vital components of a
viable ideological system, as to produce an archaeology of utility,
where people are seen as atoms in a system, is to learn nothing about
our past or about the potential for the future. This must be tempered
with a recognition of the dangers of current thinking. Giddens has
set out four characteristics of progressive thought: 1) unilinear
compression, is the phenomenon which reduces society to a stage in an
unfolding process, this in turn is applied to categorise the formation
of individual personalities, know as 2) homological compression in
which the psychological makeup conforms to criteria which mirror
social development. Normitive illusion (3), is the identification of
superior power (economic, military or political) with moral supremacy
on an evolutionary scale and is related to the vanity of
ethnocentricity. Temporal distortion (4) is a confusion between
history and historicity which sees history written only in terms of
social change. These are simple enough to deconstruct but hard
relinquish since they encourage the vanity of Western society.
Normitive illusion has led to the genocide of many races caused, not
because of their evolutionary status, as we are all equally evolved,
but for the simple reason that they had no fire-arms. It is our
technical superiority which deceives to imagine our moral rights. If
we are to accept the evolvedness of all surviving cultures then
unilinear and homological compression is simply an illusion based on
categorical thinking which, by reduction, ignores the richness of
human culture and predetermines social categories complete with modes
and forces of production. To reject such formations is to admit to the
possibility of human diversity, to offer the possibility that there is
no necessary connection between progress and elitism as suggested by
Graham Clarke(1982) as he asserts that status and social inequality
are necessary for progress and that "men" acquire and retain status
as without civilisation, "men" are no more than animal...(message truncated)